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WIREs Cogn Sci
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Abstract Epiphenomenalists hold that mental properties are not reducible to neural properties and are not efficacious. The view and its motivations are explained for two kinds of mental properties. Objections, and replies on behalf of epiphenomenalism, are considered. While strict epiphenomenalism is a philosophical view, there are related views that have some empirical support. Examples of this work are discussed, and their relation to the strictly philosophical view is explained. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Consciousness

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