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WIREs Cogn Sci
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Abstract Two main questions about introspection are addressed: whether it exists, and whether it is a reliable source of self‐knowledge. Most philosophers have assumed that the answers to both questions are positive, whereas an increasing number of cognitive scientists take the view that introspection is either nonexistent (with self‐attributions of mental states being made on the same sort of interpretative basis as attributions of mental states to other people) or unreliable. A number of different models of self‐knowledge are discussed, and the evidence bearing on the existence and reliability of introspection is reviewed. New experiments are required to tease apart some of the alternatives. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Attention Philosophy > Consciousness

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